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For security and justice professionals (e.g., police officers, lawyers, judges), the thousands of peer-reviewed articles
on nonverbal communication represent important sources of knowledge. However, despite the scope of the scientific
work carried out on this subject, professionals can turn to programs, methods, and approaches that fail to reflect the
state of science. The objective of this article is to examine (i) concepts of nonverbal communication conveyed by these
programs, methods, and approaches, but also (ii) the consequences of their use (e.g., on the life or liberty of individuals).
To achieve this objective, we describe the scope of scientific research on nonverbal communication. A program (SPOT;
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques), a method (the BAI; Behavior Analysis Interview) and an approach
(synergology) that each run counter to the state of science are examined. Finally, we outline five hypotheses to explain
why some organizations in the fields of security and justice are turning to pseudoscience and pseudoscientific techniques.
We conclude the article by inviting these organizations to work with the international community of scholars who have
scientific expertise in nonverbal communication and lie (and truth) detection to implement evidence-based practices.
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Análisis de la comunicación no verbal: los peligros de la pseudociencia en
entornos de seguridad y justicia
R E S U M E N
Palabras clave:
Pseudociencia
Comunicación no verbal
SPOT
Entrevista de análisis de
conducta
Sinergología

Para los profesionales de la seguridad y la justicia (policías, abogados, jueces), los miles de artículos revisados por pares
sobre comunicación no verbal representan fuentes importantes de conocimiento. Sin embargo, a pesar del alcance del
trabajo científico realizado sobre este tema, los profesionales pueden recurrir a programas, métodos y enfoques que no
reflejan el estado real de la ciencia. El objetivo de este artículo es examinar (i) los conceptos de comunicación no verbal
transmitidos por estos programas, métodos y enfoques, pero también (ii) las consecuencias de su uso (por ejemplo, sobre
la vida o la libertad de las personas). Para lograr estos objetivos, describimos el alcance de la investigación científica sobre
la comunicación no verbal. Se examina un programa (SPOT: Evaluación de pasajeros mediante técnicas de observación),
un método (BAI: Entrevista de análisis de conducta) y un enfoque (sinergología) que contradicen el estado de la ciencia.
Finalmente, presentamos cinco hipótesis para explicar por qué algunas organizaciones en los campos de la seguridad y la
justicia están recurriendo a la pseudociencia y a las técnicas pseudocientíficas. Concluimos el artículo invitando a estas
organizaciones a trabajar con la comunidad académica internacional especializada en la investigación sobre comunicación
no verbal y detección de mentiras (y verdad) para implementar prácticas basadas en la evidencia.
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Nonverbal communication generally refers to any communication
made other than by words (Knapp, Hall, & Horgan, 2014; Patterson,
2011). For example, a person’s physical and vocal characteristics
transmit information. Nonverbal behaviors (e.g., facial expressions,
gestures) and interpersonal distances also play an important role in
face-to-face interactions (Burgoon, Guerrero, & Floyd, 2010; Moore,
Hickson, & Stacks, 2014). The volume, the range, and the complexity
of scientific research on nonverbal communication may be seen
from comprehensive handbooks on the topic published in recent
years (Hall & Knapp, 2013; Manusov & Patterson, 2006; Matsumoto,
Hwang, & Frank, 2016).
For security and justice professionals (e.g., police officers, lawyers,
judges), the thousands of peer-reviewed articles on nonverbal
communication represent important sources of knowledge, including
on the detection of lies or mal-intent (Granhag & Strömwall, 2004;
Granhag, Vrij, & Verschuere, 2015; Vrij, 2008). Lying, however,
cannot be detected at a glance as is often stated on the Internet.
The belief that gaze avoidance allows lie detection is a widespread
misconception (The Global Deception Research Team, 2006). Like
the unrealistic expectations of the public toward forensic science
(Chin & Workewych, 2016), nonverbal communication has suffered
from its popularity in television series (e.g., Lie to Me) and other
popular media (Levine, Serota, & Shulman, 2010; Vrij, Granhag, &
Porter, 2010). In fact, scholars who have scientific expertise in lie (and
truth) detection agree that there are no nonverbal behaviors that are
present in all liars and are absent in all people who tell the truth.
There are no nonverbal behaviors that are indicative of deception,
such as Pinocchio’s nose (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). In addition,
when facial expressions and gestures are documented as having
a link to lying, this link is typically weak (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij
et al., 2017) and often moderated by situational variables (Sporer &
Schwandt, 2006, 2007). In other words, although not a silver bullet,
the analysis of an individual’s nonverbal behaviors can be based on
knowledge published in peer-reviewed scientific journals. In fact,
research conducted by the international community of scholars who
have scientific expertise in nonverbal communication can inform
understanding of a wide range of human behaviors (Burgoon et al.,
2010; Knapp et al., 2014; Moore et al., 2014; Patterson, 2011).
Despite the wealth of peer-reviewed knowledge on nonverbal
communication, security and justice professionals can readily find
widely disseminated programs, methods, and approaches that fail
to reflect the state of science and promote pseudoscientific claims.
The objective of this article is to examine (i) concepts of nonverbal
communication conveyed by these programs, methods, and
approaches, but also (ii) the consequences of their use. To achieve this
objective, we will describe the scope of scientific research on nonverbal
communication. Subsequently, we will examine a program aimed at
identifying aviation security threats through monitoring the nonverbal
behaviors and appearance of passengers at U.S. airports (SPOT; Screening
of Passengers by Observation Techniques), an interview method used
by many police forces (the BAI; Behavior Analysis Interview) and an
approach to “read gestures” taught to security and justice professionals,
including in France and Quebec (synergology). Finally, we will outline
five hypotheses to explain why some organizations in the fields of
security and justice are turning to pseudoscience and pseudoscientific
techniques. We will conclude the article by inviting these organizations
to work with the international community of scholars who have
scientific expertise in nonverbal communication and lie (and truth)
detection to implement evidence-based practices.

The Scope of Scientific Research on Nonverbal
Communication
Many of the issues facing security and justice professionals involve
the concealment and falsification of information (e.g., Garrido, Masip,

& Herrero, 2004; Mann, Garcia-Rada, Houser, & Ariely, 2014; Vrij,
Mann, Jundi, Hillman, & Hope, 2014). When it comes to developing
better professional practices to address these issues, the analysis of
nonverbal communication may, on the face of it, seem foolproof.
Indeed, it is not uncommon to read or hear that facial expressions and
gestures can be used to detect lies, and that they would be more valid
in this regard than words. Security and justice professionals would
therefore have at their fingertips, for a few thousand, or even a few
hundred dollars, programs, methods, and approaches to know what
the other person thinks but does not say.
Unfortunately,
dubious
concepts
regarding
nonverbal
communication are widely disseminated, particularly on the Internet
and in books aimed at the general public, as well as at seminars
and conferences (such as “the body language never lies”). The use
of such concepts can have negative and perhaps even disastrous
consequences (Denault, 2015; Kozinski, 2015; Lilienfeld & Landfield,
2008). For example, security and justice professionals who are not
familiar with the “peer-review” process can be misled into believing
that these dubious concepts are scientific and give them a totally
unjustified authority (Jupe & Denault, 2018). As we will demonstrate,
the reliance on such concepts is fundamentally misguided, because
decisions of security and justice professionals could be distorted and
harm the life or liberty of individuals.
Although the detection of lies or mal-intent may be of interest to
these professionals, it represents only a small part of the scientific
research being conducted on nonverbal communication. As
Plusquellec and Denault (2018) pointed out, the influence of culture,
age, and mental illness on nonverbal communication, as well as the
recognition of facial expressions and interpersonal sensitivity, are
just some of the subjects receiving attention from a community
of researchers from all over the world. Nonverbal communication
is not a subject of scientific research in which psychology alone is
concerned. For example, psychiatry, criminology, communication,
linguistics, biology, sociology, anthropology, computer science, and
ethology also focus on nonverbal communication. Regardless of the
discipline, the affiliation of researchers, and their fields of research,
the knowledge they develop is of great value because the process of
critical appraisal of knowledge (the publication process), which is a
central building block in establishing confidence in the results of a
research project, remains the same. Let us examine briefly just how
this process unfolds.
When completing a research project, the researcher generally
prepares a manuscript describing the reasons and theoretical
rationale for the study, as well as all the steps preceding its
conclusions, including the methodology, data collection, and
analyses. All these details will eventually allow the international
scientific community to scrutinize the research project to provide
support or criticism of the results in full knowledge of the facts
(e.g., in the light of other research on the subject). All these details
will also provide other researchers the opportunity to replicate
the study and compare the results (Asendorpf et al., 2013; Jupe
& Denault, 2018; Shipman, 2014; Ware, 2008). The manuscript
is then submitted to the editor of a scientific journal who sends
it to experts on the subject for a first critical evaluation. This is
the “peer-review” process. Manuscripts are commonly reviewed
double-blind, meaning that the names of the reviewers are not
known to the researcher and the name of the researcher is not
known to the reviewers. The reviewers provide feedback to
the editor. Following the reviewers’ feedback and his/her own
evaluation of the manuscript, the editor informs the researcher
that the manuscript is accepted as it is, with either minor or major
revisions, or that it is rejected (sometimes with the possibility to
revise and resubmit the manuscript after significant improvements)
(Denault & Dunbar, 2017; Jupe & Denault, 2018). Some scientific
journals in psychology have a rejection rate of up to 90% (American
Psychological Association, 2017). Since the 1960s, approximately
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30,000 peer-reviewed articles on nonverbal communication have
been published (Plusquellec & Denault, 2018).

Pseudoscience in the Security and Justice Community
Despite the extent of scientific research on nonverbal
communication (Burgoon et al., 2010; Knapp et al., 2014; Moore et
al., 2014; Patterson, 2011), security and justice professionals in some
jurisdictions have turned to programs, methods, and approaches
that fail to reflect the state of science. The consequences of the
misuses of nonverbal communication are important enough to
question the responsibility of organizations in the fields of security
and justice that have used either SPOT, the BAI, or synergology.

SPOT
Standing for Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques,
SPOT is a program aimed at identifying aviation security threats
through monitoring the nonverbal behaviors and appearance of
passengers. This program was implemented at numerous U.S. airports
by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) following the September
11, 2001 attacks. Based on Israeli methods for attempting to detect
suspicious behaviors, SPOT was implemented in 2006 and 2007 at
42 TSA-regulated airports after being tested in 2003 and 2004 “to
understand the potential of the program, not to validate its success”
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 25). In 2010, nearly
3,000 Behavior Detection Officers (hereinafter referred to as BDOs)
were deployed at 161 of the 457 airports regulated by the TSA. SPOT
had an annual cost of approximately $212 million (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2010).
According to the TSA, SPOT was based on several sources, namely
learning tools from federal agencies, comments from law enforcement
officers (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement
Agency), and the work of researchers, including Paul Ekman, who
attempted to defend it before a committee of the U.S. Congress in
2011 (Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 2011). However,
at the time of the implementation of SPOT, the validity of identifying
aviation security threats through monitoring the nonverbal behaviors
and appearance of passengers was unknown. The effectiveness of
identifying aviation security threats using SPOT versus random
questioning (i.e., questioning passengers at random rather than on
the basis of behavioral indicators) was also unknown. According to
the TSA, SPOT was implemented because it was low cost, was easy
to set up, and provided an additional security measure for risks that
were not covered by other measures (U.S. Government Accountability
Office, 2010).
For the identification of aviation security threats, SPOT employed
the BDOs. These individuals were recruited from TSA employees who
had performed passenger and baggage screening. They received four
days of classroom and three days of field training and took an exam.
The BDOs were required, among other things, to memorize the list of
indicators to identify potential terrorists (e.g., avoiding eye contact,
looking down, wearing clothing inappropriate for the location, having
a pale face due to recent beard shaving, emitting a strong body odor,
covering the mouth with the hand when speaking; The Intercept,
2015; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). At airports, the
BDOs’ job was to observe waiting passengers (about 30 seconds per
passenger). An exchange with a passenger could be initiated during
this observation procedure. Following the exchange, if the passenger
exceeded a certain score (from the list of 94 behavioral indicators),
BDOs could conduct a pat-down and a search of his/her luggage. They
could then invite the passenger to continue his/her journey or contact
the law enforcement officers who then had the option to arrest the
passenger. In addition, when the passenger was not arrested, the
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TSA could still refuse to allow him/her to board the aircraft. Finally,
the BDOs were to enter information about their intervention into a
database (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010, 2013, 2017).
In 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), an
organization with a similar role to the Office of the Auditor General
of Canada, recommended that the TSA bring together independent
experts to validate the scientific basis of SPOT (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2010). Three years later, the GAO recommended
that the U.S. Congress consider the absence of scientific evidence on
the effectiveness of identifying aviation security threats through
the nonverbal behaviors of passengers in its SPOT funding decisions
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013). Finally, in 2017,
the GAO published a report according to which 175 out of the 178
(98%) sources cited by the TSA were not relevant for determining
the validity of SPOT. Indeed, of the 178 sources cited, only 20 were
research articles reporting data and methods. Of the remaining 158
sources, 21 were literature reviews that did not report adequate
information, and 137 were opinion papers or documents that
provided irrelevant information for establishing the scientific basis of
SPOT (e.g., newspaper articles, screenshots of medical websites). The
20 research articles were independently evaluated by two analysts:
5 articles did not meet generally accepted research standards and 12
did not validate the behavioral indicators for which they were cited
by the TSA. One source justified seven of these indicators and two
sources justified only one. In other words, the TSA did not have any
evidentiary source to support the validity of 28 of the 36 indicators on
the revised list used by the BDOs to identify aviation security threats2.
The GAO has therefore maintained its 2013 recommendations to limit
SPOT funding (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2017).
Following the 2017 report, as did the TSA in 2004 (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2010), DHS attempted to defend
SPOT, in some cases by using logical fallacies (e.g., overreliance on
anecdotal evidence; Gambrill, 2005; Lilienfeld & Landfield, 2008).
For example, it was reported that a passenger identified by BDOs
was carrying 4.4 kilograms of cocaine and that the techniques used
to hide drugs could be used to hide explosives. In addition, the TSA
replied that the BDOs had been reassigned as Transportation Security
Officers required to perform behavioral analysis for a few hours
a day to maintain their skills. However, given the lack of scientific
evidence on the effectiveness of identifying aviation security threats
through the nonverbal behaviors of passengers, the GAO expressed
concern that behavior analysis was still being used (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2017).
It should be noted that proponents of SPOT may claim that this
program worked because a terrorist act such as that of September
11, 2001 has not occurred again. However, this is another logical
fallacy. Although SPOT can deter some terrorists, just as dummy
cameras can deter some thieves, this does not mean SPOT actually
works. Furthermore, security and justice organizations should not
use tragedies to justify dubious programs, methods, and approaches
and avoid putting in place programs, methods, and approaches that
actually work.
The use of logical fallacies to justify the importance of SPOT (a
program estimated to have cost $1.5 billion from 2007 to 2015; Office
of Inspector General, 2016) seems at best questionable, especially
since SPOT created “an unacceptable risk of racial and religious
profiling” (ACLU, 2017, p. 1). Indeed, rather than detecting terrorists,
behavioral indicators have led BDOs to target immigrants. Moreover,
“until late 2012, training materials for behavior detection officers
focused exclusively on examples of Arab or Muslim terrorists” (ACLU,
2017, p. 13; see also Winter, 2015).
Did SPOT offer a false sense of security? Possibly. Could the financial
resources allocated to the TSA (e.g., taxpayers’ money) have been
invested in the development of new programs based on knowledge
published in peer-reviewed scientific journals, as well as in programs
that have already demonstrated their effectiveness? Certainly. For
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example, rather than being invested in behavior analysis programs
of unknown effectiveness, taxpayers’ money could be invested in
local law enforcement, which is generally limited in personnel and
financial resources, including the promotion of proactive policing
and prosecution (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Howard, 2004; LaFree &
Freilich, 2018).
The TSA, however, does not appear to have questioned its
approach following the 2017 report of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. Indeed, the Boston Globe (2018) recently
revealed the existence of Quiet Skies, a TSA surveillance program
where travelers (who are not under investigation and not on a
terrorist watch list) are monitored by federal agents before they
board an aircraft. This surveillance was partly based on behavioral
indicators as dubious as those of SPOT (e.g., strong body odor,
excessive perspiration, rapid eye blinking, hands that touch the
face, recent beard shaving)3. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of
using nonverbal behaviors for security controls at airports or to
determine whether people are hiding an object is limited (Ormerod
& Dando, 2015; Sweet, Meissner, & Atkinson, 2017). Moreover,
observation of behavior alone reduces accuracy in judgments
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Bond, Howard, Hutchison, & Masip, 2013;
Reinhard, Sporer, & Scharmach, 2013; Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach,
& Marksteiner, 2011). In other words, current scientific knowledge
on nonverbal communication suggests that security and justice
professionals should not rely on the observation of behavioral
indicators (or combinations of some of them) in face-to-face
interactions to detect terrorists. Dubious concepts regarding
nonverbal communication, however, continue to be used, not only
by Transportation Security Officers, but also by professionals from
other backgrounds.

The BAI
Standing for Behavior Analysis Interview, the BAI is the first step
of the Reid technique, an interrogation technique in which more
than 500,000 people have reportedly been trained (John E. Reid &
Associates, n.d.b, n.d.c). Essentially, in this first step, an investigator
conducts a non-accusatory interview with a suspect. Special attention
is paid to the suspect’s nonverbal behaviors when answering certain
questions asked by the investigator (Snook, Eastwood, & Barron,
2014; Vrij, 2008). According to the creators of the Reid technique, this
interview method is “designed to identify whether or not a person
is telling the truth or withholding relevant information concerning a
specific crime or act of wrongdoing” (John E. Reid & Associates, n.d.a).
For example, the BAI claims that some nonverbal behaviors are linked
with deception (e.g., closed and retreated posture, frozen and static,
non-frontal alignment, to lean forward constantly) or truthfulness
(e.g., open and relaxed posture, dynamic, frontal alignment, to lean
forward occasionally) (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013). At the
end of the BAI, when the guilt of the suspect “in the opinion of the
investigator, seems definite or reasonably certain” (Inbau et al., 2013,
p. 185), the investigator proceeds to the second step of the Reid
technique. The objective is then to obtain an incriminating statement
through a psychologically coercive adversarial interrogation (Masip,
Herrero, Garrido, & Barba, 2011; Snook et al., 2014; Vrij, 2008).
In this second step, the investigator must state that there is no
doubt in his/her mind that the suspect is guilty of the crime. The
investigator then provides a moral excuse for the crime so that the
suspect can “save face”. In addition, the investigator will ensure, by
various means, that the suspect cannot deny involvement (e.g., by
interrupting the suspect). Finally, “to elicit an initial admission of guilt”
(Inbau et al., 2013, p. 294), the investigator asks the suspect a question
to which both possible answers are incriminating, for example, “Was
the stolen money used to buy your drugs or to help your family?”.
Following the incriminating statement, the investigator requests

details and proceeds to obtain a written statement (Inbau et al., 2013;
Snook et al., 2014). Although it has many followers, especially in the
United States, the Reid technique can lead to miscarriages of justice
(e.g., Gudjonsson, 2014; St-Yves & Meissner, 2014).
The BAI is particularly alarming in its use of verbal and nonverbal
behaviors in determining the suspect’s guilt or innocence. For
example, according to Inbau et al. (2013), “shifts in the chair that
occur during or immediately following a significant statement, such
as denial, often indicate fear of detection and should be associated
with deception” (p. 134), and “generally speaking, a suspect who does
not make direct eye contact is probably withholding information” (p.
135). However, even if these behaviors are “inconsistent with the
existing research regarding the nonverbal behaviors of truthful and
deceptive suspects” (Blair & Kooi, 2004, p. 82), they can add weight to
the erroneous certainty of a person’s guilt or innocence.
In addition, the specific study often presented as supporting the
BAI foundations (Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley, 1994) suffers from fatal
methodological shortcomings (e.g., small sample, no comparison
group of untrained or lay evaluators; Kassin, 2015; Masip et al., 2011;
Vrij, 2008). In fact, experimental research does not support the BAI
effectiveness (Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006). As Harrigan (2005) pointed
out, the state of science is clear: “Unlike certain facial expressions,
there are few, if any, body movements that have invariant meaning
within or across cultures” (p. 139). Furthermore, research has shown
that the BAI guilt or innocence indicators merely reflect common
popular misbeliefs about behavioral correlates of guilt or innocence
(Masip, Barba, & Herrero, 2012; Masip & Herrero, 2013; Masip et
al., 2011). In short, although some other aspects of BAI may offer
avenues for research, believing that a suspect’s behavior following
certain questions signals a suspect’s guilt or innocence has little or
no scientific basis (Masip & Herrero, 2013; Vrij & Fisher, 2016; Vrij et
al., 2006; Vrij et al., 2017; see also Masip, 2017, for a recent review of
scientific research on deception detection).
Of course, as for pseudoscience and pseudoscientific techniques,
that is, bodies of information “that possess the superficial appearance
of science but lack its substance” (Lilienfeld & Landfield, 2008, p.
1216), precautions are formulated regarding behavioral indicators.
For example, Inbau et al. (2013) stated that the validity of behavioral
indicators may be influenced by “the perceived seriousness of the
offense, the mental and the physical condition of the subject, any
underlying psychiatric or personality disorders, level of intelligence,
degree of maturity, and the extent or absence of social responsibilities”
(p. 152). This call to caution, however, is of no use. Investigators
cannot know all the variables that may influence an individual’s
verbal and nonverbal behaviors. In addition, Inbau et al. (2013) do
not explain how, in practice, all these factors actually influence all
the behaviors that they link with deception or truthfulness. The
same goes for precautions regarding specific behaviors. For example,
regarding the lack of eye contact, Inbau et al. (2013) stated that it may
result from various factors, including the suspect’s culture, as well
as an inferiority complex and an emotional disorder. Worse still, in
the case of the lack of eye contact, scientific research on nonverbal
communication has even shown that it is not a valid sign of lying
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007).
In many other contexts, the dubious meanings that the BAI
assigns to verbal and nonverbal behaviors might, on the face of it,
appear amusing. When used by security and justice professionals,
however, they can lead both innocent and guilty persons to be
subjected to a psychologically coercive adversarial interrogation
and increase the risk of innocent people (especially juveniles and
other vulnerable persons) making false confessions (e.g., Horgan,
Russano, Meissner, & Evans, 2012; Kassin, 2015; Kassin & Gudjonsson,
2004; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin,
2005). The questionable meanings that the BAI assigns to verbal
and nonverbal behaviors are especially worrying because the
ability of investigators to detect lies based on nonverbal behaviors
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is generally no better than chance (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bogaard,
Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & Meissner,
2016). In addition, training in the Reid technique decreases the
accuracy of these judgments, while, at the same time, increases
investigators’ confidence in their accuracy (Kassin & Fong, 1999;
Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004; Meissner & Kassin, 2002). Despite all
this, the creators of the Reid technique continue to “guarantee”
that training in this technique allows to “increase your ability to
eliminate the innocent, identify the guilty and motivate subject’s
[sic] to tell the truth” (John E. Reid & Associates, n.d.c). In addition
to the BAI and SPOT, other programs, methods, and approaches
promote pseudoscientific claims. Synergology, an approach to
“read gestures” taught to French-speaking security and justice
professionals, is one of them.

Synergology
According to its “official” website, synergology is a “scientific
discipline of reading gestures” which is “anchored in a multidisciplinary
field at the crossroads of neurosciences and communication sciences”
(Synergology, the Official Website, n.d.b, n.d.a, our translation). It
purports to be “in this line of sciences which seek to better understand
any body movement as an indicator of an unconscious mental process”
(Monnin, 2009, p. 35, our translation). More specifically, proponents
of synergology purport that it uses “several revolutionary techniques
and methods derived from the most recent discoveries in the field of
behavioral sciences” (Gagnon, n.d.b., our translation), and fills “the lack
of a serious reference in nonverbal communication” (Bunard, 2018, p.
47, our translation). In addition, proponents of synergology claim their
approach was “founded to undo beliefs in popular communication”
(Institut Québécois de Synergologie, 2016, our translation). They
also claim that its use is restricted by a “code of ethics” (Association
Européenne de Synergologie, n.d.).
To know what the other thinks “before the other has even accessed
his own thoughts” (Bunard, 2018, p. 20, our translation), proponents
of synergology say they have accumulated thousands of videos in
databases and linked meanings to different gestures (Bunard, 2018;
Gagnon & Martineau, 2010; Story, 2018). According to the founder
of synergology, each association “must be verified in at least 80% of
the situations resulting from databases images. In the case of micro
itching, it must be verified in at least 90% of cases” (Turchet, 2009, p.
299, our translation; see also Bunard, 2018; Turchet, 2012).
For example, hand movements are supposedly of the utmost
importance because “looking at the hands, following them in all their
movements on the face and body seems to be the best way to decipher
the emotions and therefore the thoughts of our interlocutor” (Turchet,
2009, p. 103, our translation). Among the hand movements, micro
itching (i.e. “unconscious itching relieved by the tip of the finger or
nail”; Turchet, 2009, p. 311, our translation) supposedly occurs “always
in embarrassing situations that provoke internal contradictions when
we do not allow ourselves what we want, when we censor our words,
our attitudes... therefore when we are uncomfortable” (Turchet, 2009,
p. 112, our translation). In other words, a micro itching supposedly
emerges “when there are contradictions between what is said and
what is thought” (Gagnon & Martineau, 2010, p. 54, our translation;
see also Monnin, 2009). Therefore, when a person scratches under
the right nostril, it would mean that “I don’t believe what the other
person says” (Turchet, 2009, p. 136, our translation) and when a
person scratches under the left nostril, it would mean that “I don’t
say everything, or not exactly, what I think” (Turchet, 2009, p. 136,
our translation). When a person scratches on top of his/her nose on
the right, that would indicate “something bothers me in what the
other shows” (Turchet, 2009, p. 138, our translation) and when he/
she scratches on top of his/her nose on the left, that would indicate
“there is something that disturbs my image” (Turchet, 2009, p. 138,
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our translation). According to Story (2018), “there are about fifteen
ways to touch your nose, with very different interpretations” (p. 32,
our translation). In total, more than 50 different points on the face
would have different meanings when scratched (Turchet, 2009, 2012,
2017). In addition, positions of the body on a chair and those of the
head would also have different meanings (see Denault & Jupe, 2017,
for an evaluation of a “synergological” analysis).
For example, a sitting person could be in a position of withdrawal
(backward), analysis (backward to the right), escape (backward to
the left), stress and discourse control (right), reserve and emotional
control (left), attack (forward to the right), flexibility (forward to
the left), and interest (forward) (Bunard, 2018; see also Gagnon &
Martineau, 2010; Story, 2018). Moreover, “if the head is strongly bent
to the left, then we speak of submission or abandonment depending
on the context. If the head is strongly bent to the right, we speak then
of rigidity” (Bunard, 2018, p. 100, our translation). In addition, when
the head is turned to the right “we can assume that the relationship
is good, that our interlocutor is confident, in a climate conducive to
exchanges” (Story, 2018, p. 65, our translation) and when it is turned
to the left “we can assume that he is more distant, that he analyses
and classifies the information with his left brain and that as a result,
he may, by nature or according to the context, be on the defensive or
in search of performance” (Story, 2018, p. 65, our translation).
Proponents of synergology have also associated different gestures
with particular contexts, including that of lying. According to
Gagnon & Martineau (2010), “the gap between truth and lies is never
completely masked and the body transmits it” (p. 44, our translation;
see also Bunard, 2018). For example, Story (2018) claims that a liar
“tends to make two-dimensional gestures, mechanical, disembodied,
rather large” (p. 182, our translation), because “only a person who has
really experienced a situation can reproduce it in three dimensions,
with gestures sometimes very close to the body and of low amplitude”
(Story, 2018, p. 182, our translation). Gagnon and Martineau (2010)
purport that when a person pinches his/her nose while telling the
customs officer that he/she has nothing to declare, “the customs
officer being alert to the nonverbal, should ask for assistance in order
to carry out necessary checks since this gesture is closely linked to the
unspoken” (p. 57, our translation). However, according to Gagnon and
Martineau (2010), one should not rely on a single gesture, but “when
you see an inconsistency between the gesture and the word, be sure
to identify the subject of the discussion, because it is probably (not
exclusively) on this point that the person lies, exaggerates or hides
something” (p. 42, our translation). Therefore, synergology would
“save time, open up new avenues for consideration and investigation
by identifying authenticity more quickly” (Synergology, the Official
Website, n.d.c, our translation).
Despite the seemingly scientific and ethical claims of proponents
of synergology, their approach neglects the process of critical
appraisal of scientific research on nonverbal communication
(Burgoon et al., 2010; Denault & Jupe, 2017; Harrigan, Rosenthal, &
Scherer, 2005). To our knowledge, since the “creation” of synergology
in 1996 (Synergology, the Official Website, n.d.e), the meanings this
approach claims to have associated with different gestures (e.g.,
micro itching) have not been the subject of peer-reviewed articles.
They “look like rabbits you would pull out of hats: you can’t see where
they come from, and they magically appear” (Lardellier, 2008, p. 12,
our translation; see also Axelrad, 2012; Jarry, 2016, 2018; Lardellier,
2017). Furthermore, the effectiveness of seminars and conferences
on synergology as well as the effectiveness of the 200-plus hours
training to “become” a synergologist (at a cost of more than $6000
CAD) is unknown, even though the founder of synergology stated
that “our methods make it possible to detect 80% of lies in the test
called ‘guilty/innocent’” (Turchet, 2009, p. 322, our translation; see
also Turchet, 2012).
To our knowledge, the founder of synergology has published
only one peer-reviewed article in a scientific journal (Turchet, 2013),
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which did not validate the meanings associated by synergologists to
different gestures or the effectiveness of synergology. In addition, this
article was severely criticized, particularly because of methodological
and analytical defects (e.g., inappropriate comparison, data selection,
circular reasoning), and “casts serious doubt on the thousands of
gestures to which synergologists give a meaning” (Rochat, Delmas,
Denault, Elissalde, & Demarchi, 2018, p. 262, our translation; see
also Denault, Larivée, Plouffe, & Plusquellec, 2015). In other words,
synergology purports to be “founded to undo beliefs in popular
communication” (Institut Québécois de Synergologie, 2016, our
translation), but it replaces them with concepts that have not been
the subject of peer-reviewed articles. Moreover, a “code of ethics”
cannot make up for the lack of scientific evidence, especially because,
to our knowledge, no decision against a synergologist has been made
public. Such a “code of ethics” (as well as the attribution of license
numbers to synergologists) seems to mimic that of professional
governing bodies, which are provided by law. As a result, some
organizations could believe that synergology has an official cachet
that it does not have.
In addition, although synergology neglects the process of critical
appraisal of scientific research on nonverbal communication, the
meanings this approach claims to have associated with different
gestures have been widely disseminated, particularly on the Internet
and in books for the general public (e. g., Gagnon & Martineau,
2010; Turchet, 2004, 2009). One of these books, for example, was
written because, according to one of the authors, “these people [the
armed forces] didn’t want to wait until it was scientifically valid
in ten years before they could use synergology” (Collignon, 2012,
our translation). These meanings have also been disseminated at
seminars and conferences, some of which were aimed at security and
justice professionals. For example, the Bar of Quebec, the professional
governing body of lawyers whose mission is to ensure the protection
of the public, made two online training courses available until 2015.
These training courses promoted concepts specific to synergology,
which was presented as a discipline that is “based on a rigorous
scientific approach” (Barreau du Québec, n.d.a, our translation).
For example, in the first training course (taken by 1,929 members
of the Bar of Quebec; Lagacé, 2015), lawyers were taught that if a
person “squeezes his/her lips, holds his/her right hand, recounts the
past by looking to the right, scratches his/her neck back to the right,
and makes low and limited movements” (Barreau du Québec, n.d.a,
our translation), it would indicate lying. In the second training course
taken by 1,083 lawyers (Lagacé, 2015), the concepts presented had
no stronger scientific foundation. For example, “open hands, exposed
palms that move freely as the person speaks, and soft wrists indicate
open communication where nothing is hidden” (Barreau du Québec,
n.d.b, our translation). However, the use of such behavioral indicators
(or combinations of some of them) has no scientific foundation
(Hartwig & Bond, 2011, 2014; Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2002; see also Vrij,
Hartwig, & Granhag, 2019, for a recent review of scientific research on
nonverbal communication and deception detection).
In addition to the Bar of Quebec, proponents of synergology claim
to have assisted, trained, or otherwise had as clients professionals in
positions of trust or authority, including police officers and judges
of Québec courts (e.g., Régie du logement du Québec, Commission
des lésions professionnelles, Municipal Court of the City of Montreal,
Superior Court, Court of Quebec) (Denault, 2017; Denault et al., 2015).
Furthermore, “official” training centers offer the 200-plus hours
training to “become” a synergologist, notably in Belgium, France,
Quebec, Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Institut Québécois
de Synergologie, n.d.; Bunard, 2018; Synergology, the Official Website,
n.d.d). In all these cases, the use of concepts specific to synergology
by security and justice professionals can have very harmful effects.
In Quebec courts, for example, if judges use concepts specific to
synergology “having no more scientific basis than those used in
medieval ordeals” (Denault, 2015, p. 9, our translation), the outcome

of trials could be distorted, particularly when the evidence is limited
to contradictory testimonies (e. g., at a sexual assault trial where the
victim’s and the accused’s words are in opposition). Witnesses who
tell the truth could be considered dishonest, and vice-versa.
In response to criticism, synergologists argue that questions
should be asked to confirm or disprove a hypothesis after considering
several behavioral indicators and other concepts specific to their
approach (e.g., Bagoe, 2015; Gagnon, 2015; Gagnon & Martineau,
2010; Institut Québécois de Synergologie, 2018; Story, 2018; Turchet,
2010). This call to caution, however, is of no use if these behavioral
indicators and concepts have not been subjected to peer-review and
replication. Indeed, as with the Reid technique, training in synergology
could increase the confidence of judges in their ability to detect
lies, while in fact, the accuracy of their judgments could decrease.
Confirmation bias, in contrast, could lead judges to ask questions to
verify an erroneous hypothesis, to give more weight to the answers
that corroborate it and less weight to the answers that contradict it
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). In addition, also in response to criticism,
other proponents of synergology argued that the current peer
review system “offers an illusion of quality control of publications
that reassures the less well-informed and enhances the image of
researchers in the eyes of gullible people” (Loranger & Loranger, 2019,
p. 79, our translation) and suggested that their approach is criticized
because it is innovative (Denault, 2018; Jupe & Denault, 2018). Some
proponents of synergology have also used other types of responses,
including attacks on the morality and competence of the critics in
an attempt to discredit their arguments without responding to the
substance of those arguments (Denault, 2018; Denault et al., 2015;
Walton, 1987)4.
In spite of all this, synergology is now entering a new field
of application, that of identifying potential threats through the
analysis of nonverbal behaviors and preventing terrorist acts.
For example, a “specialized training in practical recognition and
probable identification of malicious intentions of individuals or
groups of individuals through the learning of known techniques
of synergology and new safety concepts” (Cellule SCAN, n.d.,
our translation; see also Gagnon, 2018) is now available. Given
that the effectiveness of synergology is dubious at best and the
effectiveness of using nonverbal behaviors for security controls
at airports or to determine whether people are hiding an object
is limited (Ormerod & Dando, 2015; Sweet et al., 2017), this new
field of application of synergology is highly questionable. Its use
for preventing terrorist acts is of even more concern because the
effectiveness of a $1.5 billion program (the SPOT) whose goal was
similar (the identification of potential threats through the analysis
of nonverbal behaviors) remains doubtful despite years of scrutiny
from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010, 2011, 2012,
2013, 2017).

Why Do Some Organizations Turn to Pseudoscience?
The reasons for irrational beliefs have been the subject of
extensive scientific literature. People’s critical thinking abilities,
political, and religious ideologies, as well as cognitive skills and
scientific knowledge are some of those reasons (Bensley & Lilienfeld,
2017; Bensley, Lilienfeld, & Powell, 2014; Boudry, Blancke, & Pigliucci,
2015; Bronstein, Pennycook, Bear, Rand, & Cannon, 2018; Gauchat,
2012; Majima, 2015; Nisbet, Cooper, & Garrett, 2015; Pennycook,
Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015; Pennycook & Rand, 2018;
Shen & Gromet, 2015). But why do some organizations in the fields
of security and justice turn to pseudoscience and pseudoscientific
techniques? To an international scientific community that has
published thousands of peer-reviewed articles on nonverbal
communication, it may seem surprising that these organizations
embrace programs, methods, and approaches that, on the surface,
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seem scientific but, in reality, are not. We offer five hypotheses as
to why some organizations turn to pseudoscience.

The Problems to Solve
First, organizations in the fields of security and justice may
be confronted with problems that these programs, methods, and
approaches could apparently solve. For example, the importance and
urgency of securing airports could partly explain why SPOT has been
implemented at numerous U.S. airports. The desire to implement
better professional practices could partly explain why the BAI is an
interview method used by many police forces and why synergology
has been taught to French-speaking security and justice professionals.
The issues may also be exacerbated or mitigated by circumstances
within or outside these organizations. For example, the attacks of
September 11, 2001, likely increased the importance and urgency of
securing airports.
It is important to emphasize that, unlike scientific knowledge,
pseudoscientific claims offer immediate and easy solutions to
complex challenges. They are thus particularly enticing. For
example, the work of security and justice professionals could be
facilitated by the use of highly accurate lie detectors during their
daily face-to-face interactions. While science cannot offer such
devices because they simply do not exist, pseudoscientific claims
can be tailored to the needs of professionals and appear to be
nearly infallible. Practitioners with limited knowledge of science
and seeking a silver bullet might find these claims quite appealing.
Thus, offering a “guarantee” that training in the Reid technique
allows to “increase your ability to eliminate the innocent, identify
the guilty and motivate subject’s [sic] to tell the truth” (John E.
Reid & Associates, n.d.c) can have a highly persuasive effect on
some police officers. Also, the fact that approaches are presented
as truly scientific can increase their credibility. Thus, the assertion
that synergology uses “several revolutionary techniques and
methods derived from the most recent discoveries in the field of
behavioral sciences” (Gagnon, n.d.b, our translation) could convince
organizations of its validity.

The Lack of Scientific Knowledge
Second, the lack of specific or general scientific knowledge could
partly explain why some organizations turn to pseudoscience and
pseudoscientific techniques. For example, knowledge of the state
of scientific research on nonverbal communication makes it easy to
recognize the true nature of the indicators conveyed by SPOT, the
BAI, and synergology. However, awareness and understanding of the
process of critical appraisal of knowledge could overcome the lack of
specific scientific knowledge. Indeed, when science is implicitly or
explicitly invoked to legitimize programs, methods, and approaches,
peer-reviewed articles that demonstrate their effectiveness should be
requested and reviewed (to assess their relevance), regardless of the
status of the individuals promoting those programs, methods, and
approaches.
The following example illustrates the importance of this advice.
In 2015, the founder of synergology (who was then pursuing a PhD
in language sciences and who obtained it two years later; Turchet,
2017) sent a formal notice to a columnist requiring him to retract
and apologize for criticizing him in a series of texts published in
a French-language daily newspaper from Montreal. In this formal
notice, which was also shared on social media by proponents of
synergology, a number of references were cited, arguing that the
columnist should have mentioned them. However, these references
did not validate the meanings associated by synergologists to
different gestures or the effectiveness of synergology. In fact, after
reviewing the references, it became apparent that “there was
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no interest in considering them in order to determine whether
synergology is a sham or not” (Denault et al., 2015, p. 440, our
translation). This episode is reminiscent of the 175 irrelevant
sources cited by the TSA to legitimize SPOT (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2017).

The Ignorance of the Importance of Science
Third, even if organizations in the fields of security and justice
do not lack specific or general scientific knowledge, they might turn
to pseudoscience because they ignore the importance of science
to improve their professional practices. Indeed, the importance of
knowledge published in peer-reviewed scientific journals comes not
only from the first critical evaluation by researchers with scientific
expertise in the subject, but also from the subsequent critical
evaluation of members of the international scientific community. In
other words, organizations essentially have two choices: (i) scientific
knowledge that, though fallible, can be supported or criticized
because everything is accessible to do so, or (ii) pseudoscientific
claims which these organizations must largely trust blindly. Without
knowing the merits of the knowledge published in peer-reviewed
scientific journals, pseudoscience can appear much more enticing
and reassuring by implementing marketing campaigns and using
logical fallacies (e.g., calls for authority; Shermer, 2002).
For example, to flaunt the merits of synergology, the following
statement was used: “Who are the synergologists? Who are
the participants, the clients who use synergology? Doctors,
neuropsychologists, psychologists, pharmacists, investigators,
economic fraud experts, high security special agents, lawyers, social
workers, caregivers, business leaders, directors, interviewers. Any
other users? Judges, lawyers, public relations officers from various
backgrounds and so on” (Gagnon, 2015, our translation). However,
as when the creators of the Reid technique state that more than
500,000 people were trained (John E. Reid & Associates, n.d.b, n.d.c),
such a statement cannot make up for the lack of scientific evidence.

The Underestimation of the Dangers of Pseudoscience
Fourth, some organizations in the fields of security and justice have
probably turned to pseudoscience because they underestimate the
disadvantages (and overestimate the advantages) of using programs,
methods, and approaches that, on the surface, seem scientific but, in
reality, are not. Beyond the fact these organizations may overlook truly
effective means because they pay attention to pseudoscientific claims,
the use of dubious concepts regarding nonverbal communication can
result in (i) failing to detect actual threats and misidentifying guilty
individuals as innocent, (ii) misidentifying innocent individuals
as guilty, and (iii) a loss of valuable time and money as well as
reputational, legal, and social consequences.
Unless they have unlimited resources, it seems unwise for these
organizations to invest time and money in learning and using
concepts that have not been the subject of peer-reviewed articles.
In addition, if some security and justice organizations are turning to
pseudoscience, their reputation could be damaged, especially if it
becomes public, and more so if people or other organizations (with
whom they do business) assume that best professional practices are
being used. The legal and social consequences are no less significant.
When they turn to pseudoscience, these organizations are exposed
to risks, such as when physicians omit to consult research findings in
scientific journals and treat their patients with programs, methods,
and approaches that have not been scientifically supported. In
other words, when they are sued because their patients have
suffered harm that could have been prevented by using evidencebased practices, physicians may find themselves in an unfortunate
position (Cohen & Eisenber, 2012; Cohen & Kemper, 2005; Foster,
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Schwartz, & DeRenzo, 2002). First developed in medicine in the
1980s (Thoma & Eaves, 2015), evidence-based practices have since
reached the field of psychosocial intervention (Eyberg, Nelson, &
Boggs, 2008; Okpych & Yu, 2014) and gained growing popularity
among security and justice professionals (Lum & Koper, 2015;
Sherman, 2013). Because their mission is to ensure the protection of
the public, professional governing bodies (including those outside
the health sector) should therefore ensure that their members rely
on evidence-based practices.

The Accountability of Researchers
Finally, when organizations in the fields of security and justice have
unrealistic expectations stemming from television series and other
popular media, and turn to pseudoscience, part of the responsibility
lies with the international scientific community (Colwell, Miller,
Miller, & Lyons, 2006; Denault & Jupe, 2017). Indeed, “the scientific
process doesn’t stop when results are published in a peer-reviewed
journal. Wider communication is also involved, and that includes
ensuring not only that information (including uncertainties) is
understood, but also that misinformation and errors are corrected
where necessary” (Williamson, 2016, p. 171).
In other words, the international scientific community must
promote more open access to knowledge published in scientific
journals by disseminating it to the general public, as well as to
organizations in the fields of security and justice that wish to
implement evidence-based practices (Freckelton, 2016). More
broadly, academics should also promote the importance of
science, explain the strengths (and limitations) of peer-reviewed
knowledge, and seek to provide accessible and convenient (and
scientifically supported) tools to meet the needs of professionals.

Conclusion
The objective of this article was to examine (i) concepts of
nonverbal communication conveyed by programs, methods, and
approaches that fail to reflect the state of science, but also (ii) the
consequences of their use by security and justice professionals. To
achieve this objective, we described the scope of scientific research
on nonverbal communication and examined a program, a method,
and an approach that each run counter to the state of science. Finally,
we outlined five hypotheses to explain why some organizations
in the fields of security and justice are turning to pseudoscience
and pseudoscientific techniques. These organizations (and their
employees) may be acting in good faith, perhaps believing they
are using the best professional practices. Good faith, however, is
not sufficient for good practice. For example, SPOT created “an
unacceptable risk of racial and religious profiling” (ACLU, 2017, p. 1),
the BAI increases the risk of innocent people (especially juveniles and
other vulnerable persons) making false confessions, and synergology
could distort the outcome of trials and important decisions made by
professionals in positions of trust or authority.
It should be noted that not all aspects of SPOT, the BAI, and
synergology are incorrect. However, the use of some evidence
published in scientific journals (embedded among a host of
pseudoscientific claims) to legitimize programs, methods, and
approaches that are not scientifically supported is a typical feature
of pseudoscience. In other words, proponents of these programs,
methods, and approaches can categorically reject the overwhelming
weight of a vast literature that runs counter to their views, and select
a few peer-reviewed articles that support them (Blancke, Boudry,
& Pigliucci, 2017; Denault et al., 2015). For example, synergologists
mobilize knowledge from laboratory experiments, including on
issues related to emotional expressions and investigative interviews
(e.g., Gagnon, n.d.a; Story, 2018; Turchet, 2009, 2012, 2013), while the

founder of synergology stated that “what we absolutely do not believe
in within synergology is experiment, because body language is made
in such a way that when we participate in an experiment, it does not
work” (Institut Européen de Synergologie, 2015, our translation; see
also Jarry, 2016).
Although the dangers of pseudoscience in security and justice
contexts are undeniable, security and justice organizations would be
mistaken to reject anything that relates to nonverbal communication
on the grounds that it is not always easy to distinguish scientific
knowledge from pseudoscientific claims. In fact, the thousands of
peer-reviewed articles on nonverbal communication are important
sources of knowledge for security and justice professionals (Burgoon
et al., 2010; Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; Granhag et al., 2015; Knapp
et al., 2014; Moore et al., 2014; Patterson, 2011; Vrij, 2008). In addition,
the usefulness of an individual’s nonverbal behaviors goes far beyond
the detection of lies or mal-intent.
For example, in recent years, the field of study of thin slices of
expressive behavior (e.g., using videos of a few seconds without
sound; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2011) has developed in an attempt to
understand experiential knowledge that results from intuition and
that has a considerable impact on rapid judgments. This field of study
has also developed in an attempt to increase the ability to accurately
observe and interpret nonverbal behaviors, including judging an
individual’s personality or propensity to psychopathology (Borkenau,
Mauer, Riemann, Spinath, & Angleitner, 2004; Carney, Colvin, &
Hall, 2007; Fowler, Lilienfeld, & Patrick, 2009; Oltmanns, Friedman,
Fiedler, & Turkheimer, 2004; Stillman, Maner, & Baumeister, 2010).
In addition, the usefulness of nonverbal communication in creating
a trust relationship between a police officer and a suspect to gather
information (Abbe & Brandon, 2013; St-Yves, 2006; Tickle-Degnen &
Rosenthal, 2009) and the automated recognition of facial expressions
(Mast, Gatica-Perez, Frauendorfer, Nguyen, & Choudhury, 2015) are
merely some of the many issues on which peer-reviewed knowledge
could benefit security and justice professionals.
Although some security and justice organizations are still turning
to pseudoscience, others have already moved past programs,
methods, and approaches that fail to reflect the state of science.
In a number of organizations, researchers are already working
closely with security and justice professionals to implement
evidence-based practices (e.g., Centre for Research and Evidence
on Security Threats, United Kingdom; High-Value Detainee
Interrogation Group, United States). Therefore, we hope that our
article will inspire all organizations, regardless of the importance
they currently attach to scientific research, to reflect more on the
dangers of pseudoscience and the importance of science in security
and justice contexts. In addition, we hope it will encourage security
and justice organizations to start or continue working with the
international community of scholars who have scientific expertise
in nonverbal communication and lie (and truth) detection to
develop evidence-based practices. We also hope that researchers
will see our article as an invitation to increase opportunities to
disseminate their scientific work, promote the scientific method,
and engage with security and justice professionals to limit the use
of pseudoscience.
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2
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2017) reported
that the TSA revised the list of 94 behavioral indicators in 2014:
“According to TSA, most of the 94 behavioral indicators were
combined, condensed, or updated for incorporation into a revised list
and a small subset were eliminated” (p. 3).
3
It should be noted that following the report of the Boston Globe,
the TSA curtailed the program: “Agency officials told the Globe that
air marshals no longer document the minor movements and behavior
of these travelers” (Winter & Abelson, 2018).
4
For example, after having himself completed the 200-plus hours
training to “become” a synergologist, the first author severed his
links with synergology, transitioned to science by pursuing a master’s
degree in law and a doctorate in communication, and published
academic texts rigorously criticizing the use of synergology in the
justice system (e.g., Denault, 2015; Denault et al., 2015). He was then
the target of ad hominem attacks, including insults and disapproving
comments on social media (Denault, 2018).
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